This kind of belief still fits under the umbrella term "fidelity,"
but its logic works more subtly than the usual chorus that the novel was better than the film. The 2010 collection Beyond
Adaptation: Essays on Radical Transformations of Original
Works purports to focus on works that do not merely adapt their sources, but depart from them in more extensive ways.
Part of the argument that editors Phyllis Frus and Christy
Williams propose in their introduction to the collection is that the term "transformation" offers a way to get beyond the fidelity discourse that seems inherently caught up in the word "adaptation." Frus and Williams advocate that "transformation" be used to describe more significant departures from sources, while the term "adaptation" be retained for works that are "limited to representing a source text" (5). In framing the collection this way, however, Frus and Williams gloss over the significant necessary differences between adaptations and their sources. In so doing, they reinforce the place of fidelity idealism in the study of "adaptation," even as they advocate Regardless of this shift in the academic conversation, popular discourse still employs the shaky rhetoric of transference, equivalence, and replication, as the Sin City examples quoted above suggest. It is thus worth returning to this discourse in order to ask why it continues to be so seductive.
George Raitt addresses what he terms as "fidelity lust" by suggesting, somewhat paradoxically, that the attraction to fidelity is a "fascination with difference" (55). For Raitt, sameness and equivalence are not mutually exclusive with difference, because the statuses "alike" and "unlike" are relative. They will vary according to the specific criteria being used as the principle of comparison (55). He uses the following analogy to explain his meaning: an orange is different from every other orange in subtle ways, yet they are all the same and so more inquiry is needed into the ways in which audiences understand adaptations as intertextually meaningful.
Raitt also does not take as a premise that "sameness" is a Not only can we designate things as "the same" which are inherently different, but we must do so in order to communicate at all. As Nietzsche argues, we only know "leaf"
by an "arbitrary omission" of the differences between individual leaves (5), so too do we understand adaptations as such. We can say that a character, plot device, motif, or image is the same as another such element in another text only by means of an arbitrary omission of the traits that differentiate them.
These traits include, as explored earlier, the various ways that the material differences of the medium render literal The idea of a wolf is part of a system of ideas, not sharply delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of detailed enumeration. The effect, then, of calling a man a "wolf" is to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger and so on. Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principal subject (the man) […] Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of man. Since it is this metaphoric stitching that connects the texts involved in an adaptation, the recognition of sameness is a prerequisite to interpreting an adaptation as such. Paul Ricouer writes of "the wonderful 'it was and it was not,' which contains [in a nutshell] all that can be said about metaphorical truth" (224). I suggest that "it was and it was not" also contains all that can be said about the "truth" of adaptation. shorthand, there is nothing wrong with discussing adaptation in such terms. Indeed, the equating of texts can be so strong, as with Sin City and its adaptation, that it seems as though the comic was transferred onto the screen, and there is no absolute reason that it should not be discussed in this way.
The issue arises when the "it was not" of metaphor is not Pivot 1.1
properly acknowledged. Ultimately, the comic was not transferred: actors were cast and assembled on a soundstage; a screenplay was written and edited; producers, directors, set dressers, costume designers, and a myriad of other individuals made choices that impacted the final film; a soundscape and musical score were recorded and edited, as were the hours of shot footage, the various takes, the various angles; and so on.
The medium-specific production processes render the material of an adaptation entirely distinct from the adapted text. The apparent sameness in the relationship of an adaptation to its source, enabled by the power of the metaphorical "is,"
accounts for the impulse to fidelity; forgetfulness about the "is not"-the Nietzschean dissimulation-accounts for the rhetoric of fidelity.
As the field of adaptation studies continues to expand and develop, it is crucial to recognize the ongoing challenge raised by the strength of the metaphoric "is" and its tendency to obscure the "is not." As Raitt suggests, the paradoxical coexistence of sameness and difference in adaptation centralizes the reader/viewer. It is up to the audience member to form the connection, to explore the relationship between texts in whatever fashion suits that person. In regards to the popular consumption of adaptations, there is no great harm in discussing them as faithful or not, nor in using the terms of transference and equivalence; the wearing out of metaphors is part of the way that language develops. However, it is possible that a wider recognition of adaptation's metaphoric function could play a role in improving strategies of media literacy.
Future work on adaptation as metaphor will hopefully contribute to this initiative. We may continue to desire a degree of faithfulness in the adaptations of the texts we love, just as we may continue to view successful adaptations as accurate transpositions of the source text. But if we learn to recognize the roots of this desire and this perspective, we may learn to recognize, and then enhance, the complex intertextual exchange that occurs. Even if there is nothing necessarily lost in believing the lie of fidelity idealism, there may be much to be gained through a heightened awareness that it is, after all, a lie.
